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A Clash of Cases: Jury Death Qualification and the
Fair Cross-Section Requirement
I. INTRODUCTION
Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable seg-
ments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the
constitutional concept of a jury trial.'
The history of the development of the jury in America has
demonstrated a progressive change in the role, and in the constitu-
tion of that body. The shaping of the jury has moved in concert
with the ever broadening definition of a group of one's peers, cho-
sen from the community. In recent years, perhaps the most inter-
esting developments have occurred in the area of juror attitudes
toward the death penalty. The fundamental question has been
whether or not jurors' attitudes against the death penalty should
bar their service on the jury.
This essay will focus on the clash which has developed as a re-
sult of two landmark cases from the United States Supreme Court
which have had an impact upon this issue. In Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois,2 the Court ruled that jurors who could not, under any circum-
stances, vote to sentence a defendant to death could be excluded
from service on the jury at the voir dire stage.$ In Taylor v. Louisi-
ana,4 the Court ruled that a defendant was entitled to a jury
1. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). See infra notes 45-63 and accompany-
ing text.
2. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
3. Voir dire is that portion of a trial in which potential jurors, drawn from a "venire"
(i.e. group of 28 to 40 persons selected at random from the local list of jury-eligible citizens),
are interviewed by the trial judge and/or counsel, as individuals, and often in groups, to
determine each venireman's fitness to serve on the jury. The survivability of each person as
a juror depends first on his or her ability to fairly and impartially weigh the facts against
the applicable law to arrive at a verdict. Veniremen who cannot perform such a task, either
because of some personal prejudice or bias, or for some other good and sufficient reason, are
"struck for cause" by the trial judge on request of either counsel. Survivability also depends,
in part, on the arbitrary decisions of either counsel, who may, without cause or explanation,
invoke a designated number of "peremptory challenges" to strike potential jurors who they
deem, for whatever reason, will hinder the cause of their respective clients. The number of
peremptory challenges allowed by each attorney is statutorily established, and varies from 7
to 21 or more. For a more complete treatment of this subject, see S. McCART, TRIAL By JuRy
(1964).
4. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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drawn from a fair cross section of the community, and that system-
atic exclusion of any identifiable and distinct group from jury ser-
vice violated the fair cross section standard.
Although numerous courts have taken up an examination of this
apparent clash in rulings by the Supreme Court, no court has ruled
definitively with respect to the proper answer to the question
posed by these opinions. In August of 1983, however, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas decided Grigsby v. Ma-
bry.5 Grigsby represents a definitive review of all of the scientific
research and fact finding relating to juror attitudes and the death
penalty, as well as a searching review of the relevant case law
which has had an impact on this issue. After a close inspection of
both the Witherspoon and the Taylor decisions, this comment will
address the question of whether Grigsby v. Mabry is a good
decision.
II. EXCLUSION By DEATH QUALIFICATION: Witherspoon v. Illinois
In 1968, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of
whether a potential juror who had expressed conscientious scruples
against the death penalty should sit on the jury in a capital case.
In Witherspoon, the petitioner was tried for murder before a cir-
cuit court in Cook County, Illinois. The jury found the petitioner
guilty and imposed the death penalty. The court dismissed peti-
tioner's habeas corpus petition, and the Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed. The case came before the United States Supreme Court
on certiorari to address the issue of whether the disqualification of
jurors for having conscientious scruples against the death penalty
violated petitioner's right to a trial by an impartial jury, and
whether a jury so constituted tended to favor the prosecution.
At the jury selection voir dire in the instant case, an Illinois stat-
ute provided the prosecution with virtually unlimited challenges
for cause of jurors who expressed conscientious scruples against
the death penalty, or even bare opposition to capital punishment.
7
This statute addressed concern by Illinois courts for the need to
5. 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
6. 36 Ill. 2d 471, 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959), which provided: "In trials for murder it shall be
a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscien-
tious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same." The 1967
revision of that statute, though somewhat abbreviated, has been held by the Illinois Su-
preme Court to incorporate the meaning of the former section 743. See People v. Hobbs. 35
Ill. 2d 263, 274, 220 N.E.2d 469, 475 (1966).
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exclude jurors who might hesitate to return a sentence of death.'
As a result of the powerful weapon held by the prosecution in this
circumstance, nearly half of the venire of prospective jurors were
struck for cause when they expressed qualms about capital punish-
ment.9 In its efforts to eliminate from the jury all who opposed the
death penalty, the prosecution found a powerful ally in the trial
judge.10
Only one conscientious objector was questioned at any length re-
garding her views on the death penalty. Her responses could be
characterized as equivocal, general, and lacking strong conviction."
At no time did that venireperson ever indicate that she would re-
fuse to give the death penalty under any circumstances. Neverthe-
less, the trial judge excused that person from service."'
The petitioner's contention was that no jury so composed could
fairly determine the issue of guilt, because such juries were not
chosen from a cross-section of the community and were more
prone to convict than juries which were not stripped of death pen-
alty opponents.13 In support of his argument, the petitioner intro-
duced evidence from a number of studies which tended to show
that juries are prone to favor the prosecution when persons who
have scruples against capital punishment are eliminated from
those juries.
14
The Supreme Court was forced to reject the petitioner's conten-
tions because:
The data adduced by the petitioner, however, are too tentative and frag-
mentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to
favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt .... In light of the pres-
ently available information, we are not prepared to announce a per se con-
stitutional rule requiring a reversal of every conviction returned by a jury
selected as this one was.15
8. See People v. Carpenter, 13 IMI. 2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 100 (1958).
9. 391 U.S. at 513.
10. The trial judge stated, "[ljet's get these conscientious objectors out of the way
without wasting time on any of them." Id. at 514. Forty-seven veniremen were then elimi-
nated in rapid succession. Id.
11. Id. at 515.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 516.
14. Id. at 517 n.10. Petitioner's evidence included W. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punish-
ment and Jury Performance, (1964) (Unpublished Manuscript, University of Texas); F.
Goldberg, Attitude Toward Capital Punishment and Behavior as a Juror in Simulated Capi-
tal Cases, (Undated) (Unpublished Manuscript, Morehouse College); H. Zeisel, Some In-
sights Into the Operation of Criminal Juries 42 (1957) (Confidential First Draft, University
of Chicago).
15. 391 U.S. at 518 (emphasis added). As indicated by the highlighted portions of the
1984
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In any event, the first result of the Witherspoon decision was to
permit the exclusion of persons who stated that under no circum-
stances will they impose the death penalty."6 The Court did not,
however, deny all relief to the petitioner.
Although the majority had declined to rule that exclusion of
those opposed to the death penalty made the jury conviction-
prone, it found that jurors were improperly excluded from the pen-
alty phase of the trial because of their death penalty attitudes. Mr.
Justice Stewart, writing for a five member majority, found that
elimination of these "mildly scrupled" jurors at the penalty phase
of the trial "fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the
petitioner was entitled under the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments.' 1 7 Furthermore, Witherspoon rejected the state's argument
that mildly scrupled jurors cannot be relied on to vote for death
when the law would make death a proper verdict.'8 Justice Stewart
wrote that the elimination of all death-opposed jurors from the
penalty phase of the trial produced a jury "uncommonly willing to
condemn a man to die."' 9 Observing the representative quality of
such a hanging jury, the Court stated, "[culled of all who harbor
doubts about the wisdom of capital punishment - of all who would
be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty - such a jury can
speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority. ' 20 The Court's
poignant rhetoric established that no man could, under the Consti-
tution, be put to death by a jury shorn of those who opposed capi-
tal punishment.
In a separate opinion filed by Mr. Justice Douglas, the first glim-
above passage, together with relevant portions of footnote 18 of the opinion, id. at 519 n.18,
the Witherspoon Court appeared to be inviting future courts to address this issue in the
event that further, more conclusive scientific research became available.
16. Such persons have come to be known as "Witherspoon Excludables" [hereinafter
"WEs"]. See infra notes 79-148 and accompanying text.
17. 391 U.S. at 518 (citing, inter alia, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84-86
(1942)).
18. The opinion stated:
A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the
discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he
takes as a juror . . . guided by neither rule nor standard, "free to select or reject as it
[sees] fit," a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punish-
ment can do little more - and must do nothing less - than express the conscience of
the community on the ultimate question of life and death.
391 U.S. at 519.
19. Id. at 521.
20. Id. at 520 n.16. The Court cited POLLS, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW ON PUBLIC OPINION,
Vol. II, No. 3, at 84 (1967) for the proposition that, in 1966, 42% of Americans favored
capital punishment, 47% opposed it, and 11% were undecided. Id..
Vol. 22:725
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merings of the clash of opinions became apparent. Justice Douglas
recognized the fair cross section concept as vital to and dispositive
of the ultimate jury composition.2" The minority opinion raised the
question of why a defendant may not have the benefit of commu-
nity opinion against the death penalty, instead of having his fate
entrusted to a jury that is enthusiastic about the death penalty,
especially where "the law does not contain an inexorable command
of 'an eye for an eye.' "22 Justice Douglas called upon the Court to
assume2 3 that the absence of those opposed to the death penalty
would "rob the jury of certain peculiar qualities of human nature
as would the exclusion of women from juries."2 ' He stated:
I would not require a specific showing of a likelihood of prejudice, for I feel
that we must proceed on the assumption that in many, if not most, cases of
class exclusion on the basis of beliefs or attitudes some prejudice does result
and many times will not be subject to precise measurement. Indeed, that
prejudice "is so subtle, so intangible, that it escapes the ordinary methods
of proof. 5
Thus, Witherspoon set the stage for review of future scientific
evidence to replace what Mr. Justice Douglas offered as an as-
sumption, that exclusion of jurors in opposition to the death pen-
alty denied defendants their rights under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAIR CROSS-SECTION RATIONALE:
Taylor v. Louisiana
A. Pre-Taylor
Early in our nation's history, the composition of juries was not
an issue, since, generally, only white males were permitted to serve
as jurors. Through the first one hundred years of jurisprudence, all
courts in this country followed an attitude best elucidated by the
Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia:"'
The constitution of juries is a very essential part of the protection such a
mode of trial is intended to secure. The very idea of a jury is a body of men
21. Id. at 528 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. I.e., without the benefit of scientific studies or other such knowledge.
24. Id. at 531 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas cited Ballard v. United States,
329 U.S. 187 (1946), in support of his assertion. Ballard is a key case in the development of
the Taylor fair cross-section rationale. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
25. 391 U.S. at 531 (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 300 (1947)(dissenting
opinion)).
26. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
1984 729
Duquesne Law Review
composed of the peer or equals of the person who right it is selected or
summoned to determine; that is of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons
having the same legal status in society as that which he holds.
7
The Strauder Court's language emphasized the prevalent Ameri-
can feeling that women and blacks had no place on a jury, and that
the composition of such a body needed to be exclusively male. It
should come as no surprise that the development of the "fair cross
section" requirement for juries followed a path made by the eman-
cipation of Blacks and women in America.
The first state to allow women to serve on the jury was Utah in
1878,8 but no other state followed suit until spurred by a rash of
judicial decisions in the 1920's.2 9 Finally, in a series of decisions
beginning in 1940, the Supreme Court undertook to rule on the
impact and the constitutionality of various practices relating to
jury selection.
In Smith v. Texas,30 the Court ruled that systematic exclusion of
Negroes form jury service violated the notion that juries be drawn
from "a body truly representative of the community." ' In Glasser
v. United States, 2 the Court echoed its ruling in Smith, stating
that the jury should not be "the organ of any special group or
class." 3 Subsequently, in two decisions by the Supreme Court, the
issue of exclusion of women from jury service was raised. In Bal-
lard v. United States," it was held that the systematic exclusion of
women from jury service was improper, and the conviction was re-
versed. Brown v. Allen85 concluded that judicial supervision of
state jury practices would only be invoked where the state's selec-
tion system did not operate to provide juries which "reasonably
reflect[ed] a cross-section of the population suitable in character
and intelligence for that civic duty."' The Brown decision went on
to embrace the notion that women were included in that all-impor-
27. Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
28. See generally B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, S. Ross, SEx DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW - CAUSES AND REMEDIES 66-68 (1975).
29. See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 197 Ind. 625, 150 N.E. 917 (1926); State v. Walker, 192
Iowa 823, 185 N.W. 619 (1921); People v. Barlty, 212 Mich. 580, 180 N.W. 423 (1921); Parus
v. District Court, 42 Nev. 229, 174 P. 706 (1918); Thatcher v. Pa. 0 & D. R.R., 33 Ohio App.
242, 168 N.E. 859 (1928); Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 114 A. 825 (1921).
30. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
31. Id. at 130.
32. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
33. Id. at 86.
34. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
35. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).




These decisions, along with several later opinions, 7 firmly estab-
lished the right of women to serve on juries, absent a legitimate
statutory exemption. Although a state was not permitted to create
an exclusion as women from jury service, nothing in the above
cases prevented states from exercising their right to create valid
statutory exemptions. This was exhibited in Hoyt v. Florida.3 8 In
Hoyt, the petitioner attacked the constitutionality of a Florida
statute that provided that no woman would be eligible for jury ser-
vice unless she had registered with the clerk of courts her desire to
be placed on the jury list. The petitioner claimed that the effect of
the statutory provision was to unconstitutionally exclude women
from jury service.3 9 The petitioner argued that women added more
understanding and more compassion to the jury than men, and,
therefore, their exclusion hampered her ability to persuade the
jury to her defense of temporary insanity.40 The Court held that
the fourteenth amendment did not guarantee a jury tailored to the
circumstances of a particular case, and that the only requirement
was that juries be indiscriminately drawn from those in the com-
munity eligible for jury service "untrammeled by arbitrary exclu-
sions. ' 4 1 Some of the bases chosen by the Court to support this
ruling reveal the nature of the operational bias at that time:
In [no] respect can we conclude that Florida's statute is not "based on some
reasonable classification," and that it is thus infected with unconstitutional-
ity. Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions
and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of commu-
nity life formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded
as the center of home and family life. We cannot say that it is constitution-
ally impermissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to
conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service
unless she herself determines that such service is consistent with her own
special responsibilities.
42
Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the "automatic exemption" of
women from jury service, by justifying the state's legitimate inter-
est in keeping women the center of the home and family life.
37. See, e.g., Peters v. Kifi, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972); Williams v. Florida, 349 U.S. 78 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
38. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
39. 368 U.S. at 58. Her claim seems to have some substance, since female representa-
tion on Florida juries at that time amounted to less than 5% of the whole. Id. at 67.
40. Id. at 59.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 61.
1984
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B. The Taylor Decision
As a result of the Supreme Court rulings, beginning in 1940 with
Smith v. Texas,4 it is obvious that no state could legitimately sup-
port a statute which excludes women altogether from jury service,
and no state does. Today, many states still retain exemptions for
various groups (for example, doctors and lawyers), including ex-
emptions for mothers with children under the age of ten. But by
1974, five states still had statutes which provided for "automatic
exemption" of women from jury service." Against this background,
the Supreme Court convened to decide the landmark case of Tay-
lor v. Louisiana."
Defendant Billy Taylor was indicted by a Louisiana grand jury
for aggravated kidnapping. Taylor moved to quash the petit jury
venire, claiming that systematic exclusion of women from jury ser-
vice in that jurisdiction denied to him his federal constitutional
right to "a fair trial by jury of a representative segment of the
community. '4 Taylor's motion was based on the fact that approxi-
mately fifty-three percent of those eligible for jury service in the
Twenty-second Judicial District of Louisiana, the site of the in-
stant trial, were women. Of that number, less than ten percent of
the women eligible for service actually served on jury duty.47 Tay-
lor contended that the reason for such poor attendance by women
on juries was the Louisiana jury selection system itself.48 The mo-
tion to quash was denied by the trial court, and that decision was
upheld by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to rule on "[w]hether the Louisiana
jury-selection system deprived appellant of his Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendment right to an impartial jury trial.
'4 9
In ruling on the above issue, the Court raised four sub-issues: (1)
whether a man has standing to challenge the exclusion of women
from a jury; (2) whether the presence of a "fair cross-section" of
43. 311 U.S. 128 (1940) See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
44. In addition to Louisiana, these states included Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, New
York, and Tennessee. (citations omitted).
45. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
46. Id. at 524.
47. Id.
48. Id. It had been stipulated that the disproportionate number of men to women
serving on juries was caused by operation of LA. CONST., Art. VII, § 41, and LA. CODE CRIM
PROc. ANN. art 402 (West 1967).The venire drawn was 175 jurors, none of which were
women. This result was caused by the operation of the statutory automatic exemption of
women from jury service. 419 U.S. at 524.
49. 419 U.S. at 525.
732 Vol. 22:725
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the community on jury lists is essential to the fulfillment of sixth
and fourteenth amendment rights; (3) whether women are suffi-
ciently numerous and distinct from men that if they were ex-
cluded, a fair cross section of the community cannot be had; and
(4) whether the state has a legitimate interest in the role of
mothers as the focal point of the family such that they can legiti-
mately exempt them as a class from jury service.50
Initially, the Court ruled that anyone has standing to object to a
denial of his or her equal protection and due process rights. Justice
White, writing for the majority, noted Peters v. Kiff, 51 wherein the
petitioner challenged the venire because no Negroes appeared as
potential jurors. Peters upheld the defendant's standing to chal-
lenge the venire, despite the fact that the defendant was not a
member of the class excluded. Similarly, the Taylor Court ruled
that the defendant had equal standing to challenge the potential
denial of his constitutional rights.
52
Continuing, the majority found that the presence in a jury of a
fair cross section of the community was mandatory to the guaran-
tees embodied in the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution.53
We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury
trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are convinced that the re-
quirement has solid foundation. . . . Restricting jury service to only special
groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the commu-
nity cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial."
The next portion of the opinion addressed the question of
whether women as a class contribute something which, by its very
nature, is a significant and distinct part of the "fair cross-section"
of society. Justice White observed that women do contribute a dis-
tinct and significant element to juries. This reasoning was sup-
ported by the observation that women neither act nor tend to act
as a class, that a community of men or a community of women is
different from a community of men and women, and that the two
sexes are not fungible - there is a subtle interplay between both.55
The opinion drew various and perhaps confusing conclusions with
50. Id. at 526, 531, 533.
51. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
52. 419 U.S. at 526.
53. Id. at 526-31. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
development of the fair cross-section requirement.
54. 419 U.S. at 530.
55. Id. at 531-32.
1984
Duquesne Law Review
respect to the contribution of women to jury service. The Court
recognized that their contribution was "imponderable," and gave
"a flavor - a distinct quality," "may not make one iota of differ-
ence," but further, was "unknown, unknowable.""
Finally, the Court ruled on whether the state's legitimate inter-
est includes protecting the role of mothers as the center of family
life. In the past, the Court had strongly supported the notion that
the presence of women on juries was an essential element in the
fair cross-section requirement. In keeping with the spirit of the de-
cision, the Court specifically overruled Hoyt v. Florida and said
that states could not exclude all women from jury service on the
basis that it would create a hardship for some mothers.
5 7
In holding that the sixth and fourteenth amendments required
juries to be composed of a fair cross-section of the community, the
Court concluded that this did not require that juries must mirror
the actual percentage make-up of the community, nor that defen-
dants were entitled to juries of any particular composition, and
that states were free to permit reasonable statutory exemptions
consistent with the above reasoning.5
Justice Rehnquist's dissent began by challenging the decision
that the defendant was entitled to a new trial. "[The Court
reverses] without a suggestion, much less a showing, that the ap-
pellant has been unfairly treated or prejudiced in any way by the
manner in which his jury was selected. '59 Justice Rehnquist fur-
ther attacked the majority's interpretation of the fair cross-section
requirement, stating that the only requirement imposed by the
Constitution is that jury selection systems be developed which are
unlikely to result in bias or partial juries.6 0 This requirement, ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, does not fairly encompass the neces-
56. Id. at 532, citing Peters v. Kiff. 407 U.S. 493, 502-04 (1972). The Court's ruling
seems somewhat specious and contradictory. See infra the discussion on the dissent of Mr.
Justice Rehnquist notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
57. The court stated:
It is untenable to suggest these days that it would be a special hardship for each and
every woman to perform jury service or that society cannot spare any women from
their present duties. This may be the case with many, and it may be burdensome to
sort out those who should be exempted from those who should serve. But that task is
performed in the case of men, and the administrative convenience in dealing with
women as a class is insufficient justification for diluting the quality of community
judgement represented by the jury in criminal trials.
419 U.S. at 534-35.
58. Id. at 538.
59. Id. at 538-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 539 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
734 Vol. 22:725
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sity of including women as mandatory members of the venire.6
Finally, Justice Rehnquist demanded the demonstration of any
workable logic in the suggestion that women give the jury a dis-
tinct flavor or quality. He asked why, if women give such a unique
contribution to the jury system, that "flavor" is not of such impor-
tance as to offend the Constitution if any particular jury is not so
enriched. Justice Rehnquist referred to this reasoning as "mysti-
cism," and reflected that courts do not seem overly anxious to
practice this mysticism equitably,62 since the exclusion of doctors,
lawyers, and others from jury service continues to be recognized as
constitutionally permissible. Justice Rehnquist closed with the
protest, "[a]bsent any suggestion that appellant's trial was unfairly
conducted, or that it was unreliable, I would not require Louisiana
to retry him." '
C. Post-Taylor Developments
Although the Court in Taylor adopted the fair cross-section re-
quirement, it left one issue unresolved. The Taylor Court struck
down a Louisiana statute that provided an automatic exemption
from jury service for women who did not affirmatively choose oth-
erwise. In Duren v. Missouri,"' the Court reviewed the unresolved
issue of the constitutionality of a statute which permitted women
to elect an exemption to jury service. This active exemption re-
sulted in jury service in Missouri by less than fifteen percent of the
women eligible to serve.65 Consistent with the trend started in
Taylor, the Duren Court ruled that any statutory provision which
operated to exclude any large, well-defined class of people from
jury service was ipso facto unconstitutional. The Missouri statute
at issue did not, of course, survive this test.6
61. Id.
62. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 543 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. 439 U.S. 357 (1978).
65. Id. at 360.
66. The Court qualified, "[wie recognize that a State may have an important interest
in assuring that those members of the family responsible for the care of children are availa-
ble to do so. An exemption appropriately tailored to this interest would, we think, survive a
fair-cross-section challenge." Id. at 370.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent was, again, long and eloquent. He stressed many of the
same concerns that surfaced in his dissent in Taylor. His primary concern may be illus-
trated by this excerpt: "The reversal of concededly fair convictions returned by concededly
impartial juries is, to say the least, an irrational means of vindicating the equal protection
rights of those unconstitutionally excluded from jury service." Id. at 373 n.* (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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In cases that have implicated the issues in Taylor and Duren,
the Court has continued to cite both cases as accurate representa-
tions of the constitutional requirement for jury selection. In Daniel
v. Louisiana,67 it was held that although Taylor accurately de-
scribed the fair cross-section requirement, it could not be applied
retroactively to those cases where the jury was impaneled prior to
that decision date, since retroactivity would not operate to vindi-
cate the addressed threat to the sixth amendment and would sub-
stantially hamper the criminal justice system.
In Craig v. Boren,"8 the Supreme Court, consistent with Taylor,
affirmatively rejected the "woman's role in the home" theory, and
affirmed the "women in the marketplace of world ideas" analysis."
Similarly, in Castaneda v. Partida7 0 the high Court cited Taylor
as the controlling test for discrimination in jury selection and the
systematic exclusion of distinctive groups.71 More recently, in Bull-
ington v. Missouri,7 the Supreme Court cited Duren as controlling
on the question of a state statute providing an exemption for
mothers from jury service.s
The various circuits are currently citing both Taylor and Duren
with approval. In United States v. Van Scoy, 7 ' the United States
67. 420 U.S. 31 (1975). Appellant therein was tried before a Louisiana jury and con-
victed of armed robbery in 1973. The jury venire was chosen pursuant to LA. CONST. art.
VII, § 41, and LA CODE CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 402 (West 1967). Timely motion to quash the
venire was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
on the issue of retroactive reach of Taylor v. Louisiana, 297 So. 2d 417 (1974).
68. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Appellant therein brought an action for declarative and in-
junctive relief from an Oklahoma statutory scheme which he claimed exercised gender-based
discrimination against males in the sale and service of "non-intoxicant" 3.2% beer. A three
judge federal panel ruled that the Oklahoma statutory scheme was constitutional. 399 F.
Supp. 1304 (W.D. Okla. 1975). This appeal followed.
69. 429 U.S. at 199.
70. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). Respondent therein, a Mexican-American, sought federal
habeas corpus relief on his claim that the Texas "Key-man" system for selection of grand
juries denied him his fourteenth amendment rights to due process and equal protection,
claiming that such a system failed to incorporate significant numbers of Mexican-Americans
into grand jury service, and that such representation was grossly imbalanced in relation to
the percentage of eligible Mexican-Americans in that area. The district court's ruling that
respondent had failed to prove his case, 384 F. Supp. 79 (S.D. Tex. 1979), was reversed on
appeal. 524 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1975). From that reversal, the State of Texas appealed.
71. 430 U.S. at 510.
72. 451 U.S. 430 (1980). Petitioner therein sought reversal of a grant of writ of prohi-
bition ordered by the Missouri Supreme Court. The writ permitted Missouri to retry the
petitioner on first degree murder charges and invoke the same aggravating circumstances in
seeking the death penalty for the petitioner as had been advanced at the original trial,
thereby potentially implicating constitutional double jeopardy prohibitions.
73. Id. at 436. See also Jones v. Missouri. 441 U.S. 902 (1979).
74. 654 F.2d 257 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981).
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that the Taylor doc-
trine was not offended by the jury selection plan for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, a plan which provided that members of
certain defined classes could be "excused" from service upon re-
quest.7" This provision distinguishes the plan from the strictures in
Taylor relating to the exclusion of groups in the community. In
addition, the appellant in Van Scoy failed to demonstrate that the
plan did in actuality exclude a cognizable group from jury
service.76
It is apparent that the trend in the Court since the decision in
Taylor in 1974 has progressed toward a stricter standard in judg-
ing potential discriminatory exclusion of women from jury service.
The critical decisions discussed, Taylor and Duren, have estab-
lished the fair cross-section test for judging the constitutionality of
statutory provisions relating to exclusion of any group in society.
Decisions in the federal circuits," along with important state court
holdings,78 are fine tuning the application of this doctrine. The net
effect, as time will demonstrate, should be the elimination of any
exclusion of a definable group of people from jury service. If Jus-
tice Rehnquist will forgive the Court, and see the end as justifying
the means, the results should fairly approach the goal intended by
the drafters of the sixth amendment.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE STANDARDS: Grigsby v. Mabry
By now, the clash should be apparent. On the one hand, the
Witherspoon Court requires that persons having an inability to
vote for the death penalty under appropriate circumstances must
be excluded from jury service. Cases construing Witherspoon have
held that there is no prohibition from excluding persons having
conscientious scruples against the death penalty from the jury.7
Yet the Supreme Court in Taylor has held that no identifiable or
distinct class or group can be systematically excluded from service.
A review of a recent case which attempted to address this conflict
75. 654 F.2d 257 at 263. Such individuals included, for example, lawyers, doctors, and
various other professionals.
76. In Van Scoy, the issues involved service on the grand jury, as distinguished from
the petit jury, but the legal analysis in which the court engaged is interchangeable to both
types of juries.
77. See, e.g., Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Abell,
552 F. Supp. 316 (D. Me. 1982).
78. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 438 A.2d 951 (1981).
79. See supra notes 6-25 and accompanying text.
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will set the stage for the Grigsby holding of the Arkansas District
Court.
A. Spinkellink v. Wainwright
In Spinkellink v. Wainwright,s° the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals ruled on the habeas corpus contentions of the petitioner,
which included the claim that the exclusion of two venirepersons
because of their conscientious scruples against the death penalty
violated his constitutional rights. With respect to the issues
presented here, the court held that no proof existed that the
death-qualification process caused the resulting jury to be guilt-
prone;8 that death-qualification did not violate the Taylor fair
cross-section requirement; 2 and finally, that death-qualifying a
jury did not impact on that jury's ability to "maintain a link be-
tween contemporary community values and the penal system."8 8
In ruling that death-qualifying did not create a conviction-prone
jury, the Spinkellink court observed that "the veniremen chosen
to be jurors indicated only that they had no conscientious scruples
against the death penalty and that in a proper case they would
recommend capital punishment . . . [s]uch persons cannot accu-
rately be branded prosecution-prone. "84 In support of this proposi-
tion, the court cited Turberville v. United States,8" wherein Judge
Pettyman, writing for the majority made the following
observations:
No proof is available, so far as we know, and we can imagine none, to indi-
cate that generally speaking, persons not opposed to capital punishment are
so bent in their hostility to criminals as to be incapable of rendering impar-
tial verdicts on the law and the evidence in a capital case. Being not op-
posed to capital punishment is not synonymous with favoring it ....
[Therefore] [w]e think the premise for the thesis has no substance.8 6
On the basis of this dicta from the Turberville court, the majority
in Spinkellink rejected the notion that death-qualifying creates a
guilt-prone jury. The court went on to say that even if a death-
qualified jury were conviction-prone, it would not necessarily lack
80. 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976, reh'g. denied, 441 U.S. 937
(1979).
81. 578 F.2d at 596.
82. Id. at 597-98.
83. Id. at 599.
84. Id. at 594.
85. 303 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
86. 303 F.2d at 420-21 (emphasis added).
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impartiality. "That a death-qualified jury is more likely to convict
than a nondeath-qualified jury does not demonstrate which jury is
impartial. It indicates only that a death-qualified jury might favor
the prosecution . *.".., The court reasoned that either of two at-
titudes might justifiably mark a juror as prosecution-prone. A juror
might indicate a preconceived opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant, or, that it was his duty to always recommend
death as the punishment for first degree murder, without thought
to any extenuating or mitigating circumstances.8 8 Hence, without
reference to scientific studies in this area, the court in Spinkellink
found no merit to the claim that death-qualified juries were, or
could be, conviction-prone. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated:
Florida apparently has concluded that, if. . .a venireman clings so stead-
fastly to the belief that capital punishment is wrong that he would never
under any circumstances agree to recommend the sentence of death, it is
entirely possible - perhaps even probable - that such a venireman could not
fairly judge a defendant's guilt or innocence when a capital felony is
charged.89
The court indicated that Florida's interest in an even-handed and
just administration of its laws, including its death penalty statute,
were too important to risk a defendant-prone jury as a result of the
inclusion of jurors expressing opposition to the death penalty.90
Therefore it was concluded that the exclusion of such jurors, to-
gether with the exclusion of jurors biased against the defendant, 91
would result in an impartial jury. Thus, the Spinkellink court rea-
soned that to suggest that a jury which is culled of its death pen-
alty opponents is prosecution-prone "is to misunderstand the
meaning of impartiality."
92
87. 578 F.2d at 594 (emphasis added). It would be charitable to characterize the
court's reasoning here as lacking a certain logical and persuasive element.
88. Id. The brevity of the potential strikes related to death penalty views seems to
underscore this court's predispositional bias in the area.
89. Id. at 595 (emphasis in original).
90. Id.
91. This concept remains undefined by the Spinkellink court. See infra notes 134-36
and accompanying text for a discussion of Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d
13301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
92. 578 F.2d at 596 & n.18. The court cites United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 963 (1954), to reject the wisdom of a "balanced" jury (i.e., one
including jurors who both favor and oppose the death penalty), since, under such a scheme,
"any juror 'can hang the jury if he cannot have his way.'" 211 F.2d at 185 n.18 (citation
omitted). The Puff court urged that the problem was that such juries would often find
themselves embroiled in disagreements and that if successive trials failed to result in a con-
viction, the result would be "practical immunity from murder." 211 F.2d at 185. It is unclear
1984
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The Spinkellink court also examined the question of violation of
the Taylor fair cross-section requirement by exclusion of those
who expressed doubts about their ability to give the death penalty.
Rejecting any possible violation of the Taylor standard, the court
indicated that, assuming that those persons excluded under the
Witherspoon standard constituted a distinct class, a real danger
existed if those jurors would be allowed to serve, as a result of their
bias. 3 It compared the bias of those excludable under Wither-
spoon with the potential bias which would result if the jury was
composed of veniremen who were related to the defendant.94 On
that basis, and without more, the court rejected any suggestion of a
violation of the Taylor requirement. Finally, the notion that the
composition of the jury was related to the jury's role as a mirror of
the contemporary values of the society was rejected. 5
B. The Grigsby Decision
Even as the Court in Witherspoon invited the various courts to
from this passage quoted by the majority just what the criteria are for innocence for a de-
fendant faced with a murder charge, while at the same time being clothed in the presump-
tion of innocence. It is equally unclear what the real role of the jury is when courts like the
ones in Puff and Spinhellink fear to have jurors who disagree. The author believes that such
disagreement lies at the very heart of the safeguard of liberty envisioned by the sixth
amendment.
93. 578 F.2d at 597.
94. Id. The Spinkellink court seriously suggests that a similar prejudice exists with
WEs as with relatives of a given defendant, and in so doing, rejects the contention that WEs
or others mildly opposed to the death penalty constitute a distinctive class as described by
the Taylor Court. To suggest that those citizens who have, through perhaps the most noble
and reasoned of motives, declined to recognize or sanction the severity of capital punish-
ment have the same lack of justice and non-prejudice as, for example, the defendant's
mother or son, is to demonstrate a paucity of common sense so contemptible that it should
be reserved only for the author of the court's opinion.
95. Id. at 598 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)). The California
Supreme Court recently undertook an analysis of the current scientific research on the issue
of guilt-proneness of death-qualified juries in Hovey v. Superior Court of Alemeda County,
28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980). In Hovey, the court examined many
of the studies which were before the court in Grigsby, (i.e., the Zeisel study, the Goldberg
study, the Jurow study, etc.). See infra note 126 and accompanying text. The critical failure
of the current studies for the Hovey court was the lack of research on the existence of
persons who would automatically vote for the death penalty upon conviction despite the
circumstance. The impact of these "ADPs" (automatic death penalty) could not accurately
be measured without further research. The suggestion implicit in the Hovey ruling was that
there is a strong possibility that the exclusion of ADPs would tend to offset the exclusion of
WEs. As observed by the Arkansas District Court in Grigsby, the heavy dependence by the
California Supreme Court on the Shure study in determining the high incidence of ADPs in
America was misplaced, causing a skewed analysis in that court's balancing test. See infra
notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
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come to an understanding about the real impact of the death-qual-
ification process, opinions like Spinkellink and Hovey v. Superior
Court of Alameda County, were drafted which either ignored or
misapprehended the advances in this science since 1968. it is inter-
esting to note that these more recent opinions have both cited
Taylor, and interpreted it, all the while failing to recognize the
patent conflict in the two holdings. In Grigsby v. Mabry,"' the dis-
trict court confronted the inconsistency, developed a cogent inter-
pretation of the statistics and studies, and applied that interpreta-
tion to achieve a realistic solution to the controversy.
In Grigsby, three defendants brought federal habeas corpus ap-
peals after being convicted of first degree murder in various state
courts in Arkansas. e7 The district court, on remand from the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,9" addressed two issues: (a)
whether prospective jurors in these habeas cases were disqualified
for their death penalty views; and (b) whether the resulting death-
qualified juries were more prone to convict petitioners than would
be non-death qualified juries. 9 The opinion breaks down into five
major areas of concern, which will be discussed seriatim.
1. The Fair Cross-Section Requirement00
As a result of the first evidentiary hearing in this case, the dis-
trict court concluded that exclusion of Witherspoon Excludables
101 at the guilt phase of the trial seemed to offend sixth amend-
ment guarantees.10 2 There were two roadblocks to this conclusion.
They were first, the Witherspoon decision itself, and second, that
there was no distinction between those mildly opposed to the
death penalty and those adamantly opposed to it. That is, (in light
96. 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
97. All three defendants, James T. Grigsby, Dewayne Hulsey and Ardia McCree, were
convicted of capital murder. Defendants McCree and Grigsby received life sentences; defen-
dant Hulsey received the death sentence.
98. 637 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980). The appeal resulted from an initial evidentiary hear-
ing in the district court. Id. at 527.
99. 569 F. Supp. at 1323.
100. In this portion of the opinion, the court made a threshold examination of the fair
cross-section requirement developed in Taylor, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), and Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), by citing many of the cases cited herein at Part III, supra 569 F.
Supp. 1279-80. Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
101. For a definition of "Witherspoon Excludables," see supra note 16 and accompa-
nying text.
102. 483 F. Supp. 1372.
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of the Taylor requirements)103 there was not sufficient proof of a
difference so as to implicate two distinctive groups in society. In
order to resolve this conflict, the Grigsby court invoked the three
part test developed in Duren v. Missouri1 04 to determine whether a
violation of the "fair-cross-section" requirement had been violated.
The Duren test required that three factors be present for such a
determination:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section require-
ment, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is
a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this





The threshold problem which the district court on remand consid-
ered was whether or not a distinction could be drawn between
Witherspoon Excludables and mildly scrupled jurors for the pur-
pose of determining whether or not mildly scrupled jurors consti-
tuted a "distinctive" class under part (1) of the Duren test.106 The
court looked to United States v. Olson,10 7 for guidance respecting
what constituted a recognizable group. In Olson, the court refused
to recognize eighteen to twenty year olds as an identifiable group,
because of a failure to show that the attitudes represented by that
group were not adequately represented by individuals who were
several years older.108 The Witherspoon Court had previously
stated that Witherspoon Excludables constitutedom distinct class,109
but the Grigsby court questioned whether, under Olson, mildly
scrupled jurors were a recognizable group, since that group had a
common or shared attitudinal perspectives.110 Further, the major-
ity noted that death-qualification was the only procedure which
eliminated whole groups of otherwise impartial jurors based on a
shared attitude.1 The conclusion reached by the Grigsby court
103. 569 F. Supp. at 1278. The first Grigsby court relied heavily, for this proposition,
on U.S. v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1973) (18-20 year olds held not to be a distinctive
group in society). See 483 F. Supp. 1372.
104. 439 U.S. 357. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
105. 439 U.S. at 364.
106. 569 F. Supp. at 1282. Mildly scrupled jurors are those who hold opinions gener-
ally against the death penalty but who do not rise to the level of WEs. Id. at 1283.
107. 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1973). See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
108. 473 F.2d at 688.
109. 391 U.S. at 520.
110. 569 F. Supp. at 1282-83. See also the first Grigsby opinion, 483 F. Supp. at 1382.
111. 569 F. Supp. at 1284.
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may be summarized by the following excerpt:
No jury system can survive which permits exclusion upon the basis of a
showing of just any unconscious predilections which might tend to favor the
defendant or the state. Once again we must start with the democratic pre-
mise of the inclusion of those who can honestly swear that they can, and
will, try the case upon the law and the evidence. " '
Therefore, the first part of the Duren test was met by Grigsby's
holding that mildly scrupled jurors could not adequately reflect the
opinions of Witherspoon Excludables, so that each group com-
prised a distinct identifiable segment of the community.
The second part of the Duren test required a showing that the
representation of this group in jury venires is not proportional in
relation to the number of such persons in the community. " Citing
the first Grigsby opinion, the court found that the number of
Witherspoon Excludables in the community at large is significant,
ranging from eleven to seventeen percent of the jury-eligible citi-
zens.1 14 It also found that the exclusion of such a large number of
individuals clearly met the second part of Duren, and also violated
the basic rule favoring inclusion instead of exclusion.115 In so hold-
ing, the court found that the guarantee for a given defendant was
not any specific jury composition, but instead, was a guarantee
that no systematic exclusion would be exercised to eliminate any
specific groups.116 The final digit of the Duren test, which required
a showing that such underrepresentation was due to a systematic
exclusion of the group, was therefore met as the court found, in a
single line, that underrepresentation (which amounted to zero rep-
resentation) violated part three of the Duren test. 1 7
Thus, the first holding by the Grigsby court was that exclusion
of Witherspoon Excludables and mildly scrupled jurors violated
the Taylor fair cross-section rule, when measured against the
Duren three part test for prima facie violation of that standard. As
to the effect of such a result, it was stated that "trial by jury
cease(s) to harmonize with our traditional concepts of justice at
the very moment particular groups, classes or races otherwise
112. Id. (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 1285.
114. Id. See 483 F. Supp. at 1383.
115. 569 F. Supp. at 1285.
116. Id. at 1284 (citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980)).
117. 569 F. Supp. at 1286. See Winnick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Prac-




qualified to serve as jurors in a community are excluded as such
from jury service."11 8
2. Guilt-Proneness of Death-Qualified Juries
Perhaps the most significant result of the Grigsby decision was
the interpretation of data related to the issue of whether or not the
death qualification process tends to create a guilt-prone jury. In
Grigsby, the petitioner introduced a massive quantity of evidence
relating to this issue, which included expert testimony from three
witnesses. " Each expert had done extensive research in the area
of juries and jury decision-making, with special emphasis on the
death-qualifying process. In addition, the petitioner presented ex-
pert testimony on relevant demographic studies, together with
some 270 exhibits, including research, articles and displays. 20
Each of the experts testified that he had reached the following
conclusions respecting the guilt proneness of death-qualified juries:
(1) that persons excused by the qualification process are collec-
tively distinguishable from those not excluded by it; (2) that
death-qualified juries are prone to favor the prosecution; (3) that
such juries are prone to be hostile to the defendant; (4) that death-
qualified juries have a lighter regard for constitutional rights; and
(5) that juries so constituted tended to make judgments against
minorities more so than non-death-qualified juries. 21
The court recognized that among the studies relied on by the ex-
perts, at least two tended to directly support the conclusion that
persons who strongly oppose the death penalty (i.e. Witherspoon
Excludables) differ from not only those who favor the death pen-
alty, but also, significantly differ from those who mildly oppose the
death penalty, and that no other group adequately represented the
118. 569 F. Supp. at 1287, (citing Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 (1959)) (em-
phasis in original).
119. The experts included Dr. Edward Bronson, Professor of Law and Politics, Cal.
State at Chico, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Ph.D(Poli-Sci); Dr. Craig W. Haney, Professor of Psychol-
ogy, U. of Cal., Santa Cruz, J.D., Ph.D(Psych); Dr. Reid Hastie, Professor of Psychology,
Northwestern University, Ph.D (Psych). 569 F. Supp. at 1291.
120. Testimony on these demographic studies was given by Mr. Dale Enoch, President
of Precision Research Inc., Little Rock, Arkansas. The company which had conducted the
study. Id. at 1292-93.
121. Id. at 1293. The experts reached the stated conclusions by relying on the follow-
ing studies: Wilson, 1964; Bronson/Denver, 1970; Bronson/Butte, 1980; Bronson/Butte
Followup, 1980; Bronson/Los Angeles, 1980; Goldberg, 1970; Harris, 1971; EllsworthfFitzger-
aid, 1979. 569 F. Supp. at 1293.
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life perspective of the Witherspoon Excludables.'22 In addition , it
was found that the effect of death-qualifying tended to dispropor-
tionately decrease the representation of Blacks and women on the
jury.128 Having made these factual determinations, the court reaf-
firmed its holding that death-qualified juries violate the Taylor
fair cross-section requirements.
12 4
Blacks and women constitute significant and distinctive groups of jury eligi-
ble citizens . . . Death qualification results in their systematic dispropor-
tionate removal from juries which try the guilt-innocence of persons accused
of capital crimes, without adequate justification, in violation of the ac-
cused's right to a representative jury comprised of a fair cross-section of the
community.12 5
To support the contention of guilt-proneness, the petitioner in-
troduced evidence in the nature of seven major studies, each of
which indicated that by excluding all those from jury service who
indicated that they could not give the death penalty under any cir-
cumstances, the resulting jury was prone to decide the issue of
guilt against the defendant. 1 2  As a result of reviewing this evi-
dence, the court made the following rulings respecting this issue:
First, that systematic exclusion of Witherspoon Excludables les-
122. Id. See, e.g., Bronson/Denver, 1970 and Bronson/Butte, 1980 studies to support
this conclusion.
123. 569 F. Supp. at 1293. See also Bronson/Los Angeles, 1980; Goldberg, 1970; Har-
ris, 1971; and Ellsworth/Fitzgerald, 1979, to support this conclusion. See supra note 121 and
accompanying text.
124. 569 F. Supp. at 1293-94. See supra notes 26-78 and accompanying text.
125. 569 F. Supp. at 1294.
126. Id. at 1294-95. The following studies were introduced by the petitioner in support
of the guilt-proneness contentions.
1. Wilson, 1964 - First study to show that those in favor of death penalty were more
likely to convict, and also that death-qualified juries were more pro-prosecution and
handed out stiffer penalties.
2. Goldberg, 1970 - Agrees with Wilson findings, but subject to certain criticisms,
and generally viewed as unreliable.
3. Zeisel, 1968 - Used actual criminal jurors. Demonstrated what is "intuitively
known by judges, lawyers," etc., that death-qualified juries are more likely to convict.
4. Jurow, 1971 - Death-qualification leads to conviction-prone juries.
5. Harris Poll, 1971 - Random sample, further evidence that death-qualified juries
are conviction-prone.
6. Ellsworth, 1979 - Actually 5 studies; in-depth analysis proves that persons who
meet the Witherspoon test for death-qualification are substantially more ready to
find guilt.
7. Haney, 1979 - Confirmed "gut" opinion held by many in the legal field that death
qualifying leads to guilt-proneness. Also examined the question of whether or not the
process of asking death-qualifying questions tends to prejudice the jury against the
defendant. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1295-1304.
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sens the likelihood of an acquittal; second, that death-qualified ju-
ries vote to convict twenty to twenty-five percent more often than
non-death-qualified juries; and third, that subjects sitting on
"mixed" juries get a better grasp of the case through intense jury
deliberation.
27
As a final concern related to guilt-proneness, the court examined
the petitioner's claim, as highlighted by the results of the 1979 Ha-
ney study, that the very process of death-qualification tends to
create prejudice in the minds of the remaining jurors against the
defendant. In substance, the claim is that the questions used by
the prosecution during voir dire tend to isolate and focus the issue
of the death penalty, thus creating in the minds of the jurors a
feeling of foregone conclusion respecting the issue of the defen-
dant's guilt. In that connection, the findings of the 1979 Haney
study were as follows:
[T]hat jurors exposed to the process of death qualification during voir dire,
simply by virtue of that exposure, as compared to subjects not exposed to
that process, are (1) more predisposed to convict the defendant, (2) more
likely to assume before the trial begins that the defendant will be convicted
and will be sentenced to death, (3) more likely to assume that the judge, the
prosecutor and the defense attorney all believe the defendant to be guilty
and that he will be sentenced to die, (4) more likely to assume that judges,
prosecutors and defense attorneys believe that defendant is guilty and will
ultimately be sentenced to die, and (5) are themselves far more likely to
believe that the defendant deserves the death penalty.2 8
As a result of this study, the Grigsby court found that the very act
of asking death-qualifying questions at voir dire implants in the
minds of potential jurors the prejudice of guilt toward the
defendant.
The death-qualification process traps the participants into the necessity of
communicating false cues to the jury ... By focusing on the penalty before
the trial actually begins the key participants, the judge, the prosecutor and
the defense counsel convey the impression that they all believe the defen-
dant is guilty, that the real issue is the appropriate penalty, and that the
defendant really deserves the death penalty." 9
To summarize the court's holding on this issue, it was found that
the death-qualification process skews the predispositional balance
of the jury pool by excluding those prospective jurors who un-
equivocally express opposition to the death penalty, and that evi-
127. Id. at 1301-02.




dence shows that persons who favor the death penalty are more
likely to be in favor of the prosecution and uncommonly predis-
posed to convict the defendant.'30
3. The Automatic Death Penalty Issue
The Grigsby court briefly examined respondent's contention that
the existence of ADPs,' 31 together with the availability of strikes
for cause regarding these individuals, tended to offset any possible
prejudice which resulted from the exclusion of Witherspoon Ex-
cludables. Respondents relied heavily on the Shure study'3 2 to
support the above stated proposition. 3
It was noted that the California Supreme Court had an opportu-
nity, in Hovey v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 34 to review
much of the evidence which was before the Grigsby court, and,
that the court in Hovey was favorably impressed, especially with
the conviction-proneness studies. The Hovey court concluded,
however, that because of the nature of the California jury selection
process, the issue of guilt-proneness by elimination of Witherspoon
Excludables was irrelevant, since any such prejudice is offset by
the ability to exclude ADPs. 3 5 In Grigsby, the respondent State of
Arkansas urged that the Arkansas statute, which contained similar
provisions, afforded the same protection as the California statute.
The Grigsby court pointed out that it was disingenuous of the
state to argue, on the one hand, that no prejudice occurs from
death-qualification, while, on the other hand, argue that the preju-
dicial effects of such a process could be cured by the exclusion of a
group at the opposite end of the spectrum. In addition, it was de-
termined that the Shure study was inaccurate in that it failed to
recognize the gross disparity in number between Witherspoon Ex-
cludables and ADPs in the society.'36 On these grounds, the Grig-
sby majority rejected the notion that the exclusion of ADPs fairly
130. Id. at 1303-04.
131. That is, persons who, under all circumstances, would vote to give the death pen-
alty upon conviction in a capital case. Id. at 1288. See supra note 95 and accompanying
text.
132. Study by Dr. Gerald H. Shure on the "Automatic Death Penalty Issue." See 569
F.2d at 1305.
133. Id.
134. 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
135. Id. at 82, 616 P.2d at 1344, 168 Cal. Rptr., at 182.
136. 569 F. Supp. at 1307-08. The court took apparent judicial notice of unnamed
studies which put the number of WEs in Arkansas at over 14%, with the corresponding
number of ADPs at somewhere closer to .5% - 1% of the population.
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offset the potential prejudice created by the exclusion of Wither-
spoon Excludables.
4. State Justification For The Challenged Practice1
7
The suggested solution to death-qualification that operated
throughout the opinion was the use of a bifurcated trial, where two
juries would be impaneled, one to try the issue of guilt or inno-
cence, and one to try the issue of penalty. The State of Arkansas
raised objection to that solution, claiming, in essence, that the
financial burden to the state would be too great to require the im-
paneling of two juries for each capital case tried.1 8' The court rec-
ognized the state's legitimate interest in the imposition of a death
penalty, and further, that death qualification of the sentencing
jury would be permissible."'3 But, it concluded that the existence
of a non-death-qualified jury at the guilt determination phase was
essential to the protection of the rights of the defendant. The
state's protest about the expense which would be placed on it by
such a procedure was flatly rejected on the basis that, "[I]t is clear
to the Court . . .that said cost would be relatively small . . .It is
a rare situation when the United States Supreme Court permits
financial considerations to take priority over constitutional rights.
To deserve such priority, the asserted interests of the state must
be substantial.'
4 0
In so ruling, the court effectively eliminated any substantial im-
pediments raised by respondent's objections.
5. The Court's Conclusions
Initially, the Grigsby court points out that the United States Su-
preme Court has assumed that juries in capital cases tend to reflect
"the conscience and the standards of decency of the community"
when they make decisions regarding the death penalty.'14 But it
also found that, where groups of people are excluded from service,
the jury's ability to mirror community values is impaired.14 2 Here,
the court ruled that juries devoid of representation by strong oppo-
137. For the court's discussion of the impact of using peremptory challenges affecting
the issue of a fair cross-section of the community, see id. at 1308-13.
138. Id. at 1313-21.
139. Id. at 1318.
140. Id. at 1320.




nents of the death penalty lacked the ability to fairly portray the
values of "a fair cross section of the community," and stated:
The evidence introduced here makes it abundantly clear that juries death-
qualified under Witherspoon standards are not as representative of the
community as they could, and should be, and, therefore, do not serve the
objective of interposing between the state and the defendant the conscience
and broad collective wisdom of that community.
143
In so holding, the Grigsby court definitively ruled that the peti-
tioners were, as a result of the death-qualification process, denied
their right to a neutral and representative jury.
144
C. After Grigsby
It may come as little surprise that within eleven weeks of the
decision in Grigsby, the Supreme Court of Arkansas delivered its
opinion in Rector v. State,43 wherein that court ruled that the
Grigsby court erred and that it was proper to bar jurors unalter-
ably opposed to the death penalty. Excerpts from the court's opin-
ion demonstrate that Arkansas may be the stage for a real political
tug of war, thinly clothed in a veil of judicial interpretation. The
Rector majority made these observations: "The district judge's de-
cidedly critical analysis of our cases would be disturbing if it were




[W]e cannot regard conviction-proneness either as inherently wrong or as
destructive of the juror's impartiality. In the various studies on the subject
there is almost uniformly an undercurrent of thought, not expressed but
easily sensed, that jurors who believe in the death penalty are by their na-
ture barbarians in modern society. That view certainly condemns most
Americans.1
47
Though the Arkansas Supreme Court's attacks may be subject to
complaints of accuracy, a real concern left open by the Rector deci-
sion is what effect that ruling will have on the precedential value of
Grigsby. It may well be that the Rector decision has effectively
taken the teeth out of the powerful opinion crafted by the district
143. Id.
144. Id. The court directed that, since Hulsey was denied relief for failure to preserve
these issues through objection, and since Grigsby was already dead, that only McCree would
be required to be retried, or to be set free. Id. at 1324.





court in Arkansas. Perhaps the only thing that can save Grigsby as
a trend setter in American jurisprudence is intervention in the na-
ture of certioari by the United States Supreme Court, a possibility
that no scholar on this issue would wisely rule out.
V. CONCLUSION
The author's bias in favor of the Grigsby decision was, no doubt,
obvious throughout. The necessity to expand on such a well-
drafted and complete decision may, therefore, not exist. However,
a few observations on the fate of this issue may be in order.
It will be remembered that Grigsby recognize the right of the
state to seat a death-qualified jury at the penalty phase of a bifur-
cated capital proceeding. 4" It will also be remembered that Taylor
recognized that the role of the jury was to mirror the current com-
munity values and principles.'4 9 Some courts and commentators
have suggested that, where the jury is selected from a random sam-
pling of the community, that jury speaks with as much authority
with respect to the legitimate interests of the state as does the leg-
islature.15 0 Accepting that hypothesis, a strong argument may be
developed that no juror may be eliminated because of his bias re-
lating to the death penalty, since he or she, together with all other
attitudes represented, constitutes the conscience of the
community.' 6 '
A second question which might be raised by Grigsby is the effect
a bifurcated trial might have upon the defendant in terms of an
ability to build rapport with the jury. An argument could be made
that if a second jury was caused to be impaneled at the penalty
phase, the defendant might lose the benefit of whatever human
empathy the first jury had developed for the defendant during the
long hours of sitting at the trial. The dispassion of a second jury
might arguably work to the detriment of the defendant.
This comment declines to address the argument related to the
claim that Witherspoon Excludables would necessarily violate their
oaths as jurors because of an inability to give the death penalty, in
148. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976). Cf., Ledewitz, Foreseeing Is Believing: Community Imposition Of Liability For The
Acts of "Dangerous" Former Mental Patients, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 91 n.176, and
at 93 n.182 (1983).
151. The author declines to offer more on this argument at this time, leaving such
discussion to future commentators.
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light of the flux in the Arkansas death penalty statute near the
time of the selection of the jury in the trials in Grigsby. In 1977,
less than a year before the capital trials in question, the Arkansas
legislature amended its death penalty statute 5 2 to require that a
jury return a sentence of death when, under statutorily defined cir-
cumstances, certain factors are present. Prior to 1977, the act pro-
vided only that the jury "may" give the death penalty when cer-
tain defined circumstances were present. Therefore, under the old
law in Arkansas, a Witherspoon Excludable might still be able to
fulfill his oath as a juror if he knew that he was not required by
law to give the death penalty under any circumstance. A sugges-
tion is therefore raised as to how Witherspoon and Grigsby apply
in jurisdictions still recognizing the discretion of the jury in a capi-
tal case. Suffice it to say, it is difficult to determine for certain that
the trial judge was influenced by so recent a statutory pronounce-
ment, but if he was not, then it is unclear on what legitimate basis
he may be permitted challenges for cause against jurors irrevocably
against the death penalty.
These and other issues are left open by the Grigsby decision. It
is altogether probable that this issue, whether through the medium
of this decision, or some other decision yet unborn in the appeals
process, will be heard by the Supreme Court, to settle, perhaps
once and for all, the critical issues first raised by the clash of cases
and affirmatively dealt with by the district court in Arkansas in
Grigsby v. Mabry.
Joel Stephen Sansone
152. 41 ARK. CRIM. CODE § 1302(1) (1977).
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